

CHAPTER VI

SERVICES OF COMMON CONCERN: INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH AND REPORTS

PROPOSED RESEARCH AND REPORTS DIVISION

We have recommended in the preceding chapter that there be created a small, high-level Estimates Division to concern itself primarily with the correlation of national intelligence, subject to final approval by the Intelligence Advisory Committee. If the responsibility of the Central Intelligence Agency for the production of national intelligence is assumed by this Estimates Division, there will remain certain research and intelligence reporting functions now being performed by the Office of Reports and Estimates which might properly be carried out as a service of common concern by a newly constituted "Research and Reports Division". Other activities of the Office of Reports and Estimates should be discarded as being superfluous or competitive with the proper activities of departmental intelligence.

There is presently within the Office of Reports and Estimates a nucleus for the proposed Research and Reports Division in fields of common concern. It includes the Scientific Branch, which should be strengthened and have resttached to it the Nuclear Energy Group; the Map Branch, which produces maps and map intelligence as a recognized common service; the Economic and Transportation Fanals; and some elements from the Geographic Branches. To these there should be added the Foreign Documents Branch of the Office of Operations (See below, page 105) and the library, biographical and other registers and indices presently maintained by the Office of Collection and Dissemination.

Conerally speaking, this Division will be responsible for authoritative research and reports in economic, scientific and technological intelligence,

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the maintenance of central reference facilities, and such other matters as ere deemed of common concern. To the extent necessary, it will also coordinate the activities of the other agencies in these fields. Its staff should include in appropriate cases also guate representation from the State Department and Services so that, subject to policy guidance from the principal consumers, its products will represent the coordinated opinion of the best available talent and should be fully responsive to the requirements of the consumer agencies.

In this chapter we suggest the type of activity which should be discontinued as uncasential or duplicative, the type of activity which should be retained as a common service and some activities, not presently carried out in the Office of Reports and Estimates, which should be performed by the proposed Research and Reports Division as services of common concern. It would be the responsibility of the National Security Council, acting on the advice of the Director of Central Intelligence and the Intelligence Advisory Committee, to determine which of these central services might properly be performed, and we believe that the Coordination Division (preconstituted Interdepartmental Coordinating and Planning Staff) should examine this problem and prepare the necessary plans.

PERIODICAL SUMMARIES

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The Office of Reports and Estimates presently produces current intelligence in two principal forms: a top secret Daily Summary and a secret Weekly Summary. The former comprises abstracts of a small number of incoming and outgoing cables received during the preceding twenty-four hours. Approximately ninety per cent of the contents of the Daily Summary is derived from State Department sources, including both operational as well as intelligence material. There

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are occasional comments by the Central Intelligence Agency on portions of the Summary, but these, for the most part, appear gratuitous and lend little weight to the material itself. The result is a fragmentary publication which deals with operations as well as intelligence, without necessarily being based on the most significant materials in either category. In a summary of this type, circulated to the President and the highest officials of the Government, there is an inherent danger that it will be misleading to its consumers. This is because it is based largely on abstracts of State Department materials, not in historical perspective, lacking a full knowledge of the background or policy involved and with little previous consultation between the Central Intelligence Agency and the State Department. Moreover, it is incomplete because it is not besed on all the most important materials.

The Weekly Summary is more widely circulated then the Daily Summary, but also represents primarily political reporting and competes for attention with several departmental weekly summaries, particularly those of the State Department and the Department of the Army.

Still another periodical publication is the monthly "Review of the World Situation."

These summaries, particularly the Daily, are the subject of considerable controversy and are received with expressions ranging from moderate interest to strong criticism. The Weekly and the Daily are, to a certain extent, duplicative in that the State Department, to which political intelligence has been assigned as an area of dominant interest, also disseminates its own operational and intelligence summaries on the highest levels. As both Summaries consume an inordinate amount of time and effort and appear to be outside of the domain

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reasonable checks and balances as we have endeavored to do in the composition and responsibilities of the Intelligence Advisory Cormittee. If, for exemple, the State Department, which may be wedded to a particular policy, presents the facts distorted by faulty preconceptions, the final product, as reflected in an intelligence estimate, will be defective. It is hoped that in such a case the new Estimates Group of the Central Intelligence Agency will supply as institul corrective and that the non-State Department members of the Intelligence Advisory Committee will have sufficient breadth of knowledge to challenge the State Department estimate. Likewise, military estimates should be substituted to scrutiny so that they are compatible with each other and avoid the error, however unconscious, of magnifying the needs of their own branch of the Service.

The Intelligence Advisory Committee, if it functions properly, and is assisted by the disinterested work of the Central Intelligence Agency is the body where such distortions should be caught and corrected and the projudices of one mind challenged by the thinking of a mind which at least does not suffer from the same prejudices.


In turn, prejudice on the part of the policy-makers may render them blind even to brilliant achievements of an intelligence service. They may just refuse to listen to what they do not like. Hence, nothing would be more dangerous than to believe that if we once had an effective intelligence service and an efficient intelligence estimating body, we would be immune to a disaster like Fearl Harbor.

This does not lead to the conclusion that intelligence is futile. It merely shows its limitations. If the intelligence appraiser can keep from twisting and coloring the data he receives and if the policy-maker can keep a

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relatively open mind and be prepared for continual re-evaluation of the assumptions on which he is relying, then sound intelligence estimates can be a pillar of strength for our national security.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

- (1) In the Central Intelligence Agency there has been confusion between the responsibility of producing coordinated national intelligence estimates and responsibility for miscellaneous research and reporting activities.
- (2) The provisions of the National Security Act for the production of national intelligence estimates, as interpreted by the National Security Council Intelligence Directives, are sound but have not been effectively carried out.
- (3) There should be created in the Central Intelligence Agency a small Estimates Division which would draw upon and review the specialized intelligence product of the departmental agencies in order to prepare coordinated national intelligence estimates.
- (4) Under the leadership of the Director of Central Intelligence, these estimates should be submitted for discussion and approval by the reconstituted Intelligence Advisory Committee whose members should assume collective responsibility for them.
- (5) Provision chould be made in these arrangements for the handling of crisis situations when coordinated estimates are required without delay.
- (6) Coordinated intelligence estimates produced in this way must, in order to be effective, be recognized as the most authoritative estimates available to the policy makers.

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of the Central Intelligence Agency, we believe that the Daily, and possibly the Weekly, Summary should be discontinued in their present form. We do, however, appreciate the fact that, to some extent, there may be a need for such summaries, and we suggest that the newly constituted Coordination Division examine the situation to determine whether there is such a need and how it can best be met.

MISCELLANEOUS REPORTS AND MEMORANDA

The Office of Reports and Estimates also produces a variety of other reports, studies and surveries. Some of these are strategic and basic studies on foreign countries or areas, presenting the political, economic and military situation. Others are intended to be estimates of current international problems. These are formal reports, dealing with a variety of subjects ranging from "Possible Developments in China" to "Opposition to the ECA". These estimate-type reports are circulated throughout the various agencies for the purpose of obtaining concurrence or dissent. But the fact that they are so circulated in no way means that they are properly coordinated estimates which represent the best thinking on the subject under review. They often deal with topics which are not particularly relevant to departmental problems or national issues, with the result that the various agencies often feel that it is an imposition to be burdened with the responsibility for reviewing these documents, making appropriate comments and noting concurrence or dissent.


The Office of Reports and Estimates also initiates more informal reports by means of intelligence memoranda produced spontaneously or in answer to specific requests. These are not coordinated by circulation through the other agencies. Subjects again differ widely and include such topics as "Soviet Financing of the French Coal Strike" and "Tungsten in South Korea".

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Much of this production is academic, tends to duplicate work in other departments, has little relation to national intelligence, and is not produced as a recognized service of common concern. On the other hand, some of this production might, subject to general agreement, be performed as a central common service. In our opinion, the newly constituted Research and Reports Division should refrain from the production of essentially political studies and miscellaneous reports and should concentrate its effort upon the production of reports in those fields clearly assigned to it as recognized services of common concern.

THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY

Under National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 3, the Central Intelligence Agency is charged with preparing an outline for the National Intelligence Survey -- an extensive series of basic studies on all countries and areas of the world -- and with coordinating the necessary departmental contributions. This study has been assigned to the Office of Reports and Estimates, not as the producer, but rather as coordinator of the program, under specifications and priorities approved by the Joint Intelligence Committee. This coordination is achieved through the allocation of topics for research and production for the particular purpose of the Survey series, but there is no provision for centralization or coordination of current production in these fields.

Under this series, various chapters and sections have been farmed out to the State Department, the Services, and other qualified agencies. For instance, the Army has been assigned the responsibility for the sections on transportation and communications. The assignment of these sections does not mean that Army is recognized as having either primary interest in, or continuing responsibility

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for, intelligence with respect to transportation and communications. For the purpose only of the handbooks, the National Intelligence Survey eliminates duplication of production in certain fields and provides temporary editorial coordination of basic intelligence through the allocation of topics. It does not solve the problem of centralizing or coordinating continuing research and production in the fields of common interest.

ECONOMIC, SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL INTELLIGENCE


The Office of Reports and Estimates appears to have made no serious atterpt to produce coordinated estimates or authoritative intelligence in the fields of economic, technological and scientific intelligence, in which no department is recognized as having a dominant interest. The six Geographic Branches, the Scientific Branch and a number of the Consultant Panels are variously interested in these fields but have soldem produced authoritative intelligence contributions therein. We have found in our examination of the Contral Intelligence Agency, State Department and the three Service intelligence agencies that there is much duplication and little coordination of production on these subjects. Although often along parallel lines, studies are independently produced by the various agencies and do not, therefore, represent the best available coordinated opinion.

There has been an attempt in National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 3 to guide the effort of the various agencies into coordinated channels by the allocation of certain fields of dominant interest, but in the fields of economic, scientific and technological intelligence, each agency is authorized to produce in accordance with its needs. Thus, it is in these fields, left open to all agencies and for which responsibility is now

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divided and diffused, that the proposed Research and Reports Division could perform a valuable service of common interest by centralizing or coordinating research and intelligence production.

After the last war, the British recognized the need for some form of central agency to conduct research and produce reports in fields of common interest, and, therefore created the Joint Intelligence Bureau (JIB). This Bureau was organized under the Ministry of Defense, and its Director sits as a member of the British Joint Intelligence Committee. While not under the direct guidance of the Services or the Foreign Office, the Joint Intelligence Bureau is closely in touch with Foreign Office policy and Service policy and plans, and is responsive to the requirements of both the Foreign Office and the Services. Its responsibilities are very broad in scope, including the provision of intelligence on the economy, industrial structure, committations, transportation systems, military geography, ports and air fields and anti-aircraft and coastal defenses of foreign countries and the assessing of their war potential and vulnerability.

It is doubtful whether such a high degree of centralization in these fields, including some essentially military intolligence, is desirable in this country. Our Service intolligence agencies have been assigned fields of deminant interest, and they will continue to produce military intelligence within these areas. However, even if each intolligence agency confines itself almost entirely to the production of intelligence within its field of deminant interest, there remains a vast area of common interest in such necessary supporting fields as economic, scientific and technological intelligence.

The economic field could include, for example, industrial production, economic resources, metallurgy, fuels, power, communications and telecommunications.

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These are some of the subjects where there is present duplication among our agencies and in which a great economy of effort and improvement of product would result if intelligence were produced centrally. To provide an effective, contribution, the centrally produced reports on economic and industrial matters must represent the most authoritative coordinated opinion on the subject and must be accepted as such by the consumer agencies. A principal new consumer would be the Estimates Division, recommended in the preceding chapter. We also recognize that the requirements of the various agencies in these matters of common concern will differ, and that each agency will need to adapt to its own particular problems the intelligence produced in these fields.

Few subjects of intelligence are more important than science and technology, and yet little success thas been achieved in this country toward coordinating intelligence collection and production in these fields. Among the agencies which are interested and in a position to contribute are not only the Contral Intelligence Agency, the State Department and the three Services, but also the Atomic Energy Commission and the Research and Development Board.*

We believe that there is an obvious need for more centralization of scientific intelligence. Where centralization is not practical there should be the closest coordination among the existing agencies through the use of committees


In these fields the British have refrained from complete !centralization but have taken steps for coordination through the formation of a Joint Scientific Intelligence Committee and Joint Technical Intelligence Committee. These Committees, respectively, consist of the chiefs of the Service scientific intelligence sections and technical intelligence sections and a representative of the Director of the Joint Intelligence Bureau. The Cheirman of the Joint Scientific Intelligence Committee, a well known scientist drawn from civilian life, sits on the Joint Intelligence Committee. The three Service scientific and technical intelligence sections remain separate for each Service but are housed together with the Joint Intelligence Bureau.





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such as the present interdepartmental atomic energy intelligence committee which works in consultation with the Nuclear Energy Group of the Office of Special Operations (See below, page 114). A strong Scientific Branch, as a common service within the Central Intelligence Agency, would be the logical focal point for the coordination and appropriate centralization of scientific intelligence. There appears to be no overriding reason for the segregation of the Nuclear Energy Group within the Office of Special Operations, and it would be preferable to reattach this Group to the Scientific Branch, even though some insulation may be necessary for security reasons.*

To fulfill its responsibilities as the chief analytical and evaluating unit for scientific intelligence, and consequently as the principal guide for collection, the Branch would have to be staffed by scientists of the highest qualifications. We appreciate that in such a Branch it would be impossible to obtain a leading scientist for each of the many segments of scientific and technological intelligence, but we believe that a staff of moderate size and of high quality can cope with the normal research and evaluation, co-opting, where necessary, personnel from such organizations as the Research and Development Found and the Atomic Energy Commission.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

(1) In addition to the Estimates Division recommended in the previous Compter, there records the created out of the present Office of Reports and Estimates a Research and Reports Division to accomplish central research in, and co-craimated production of, intelligence in fields of common interest. The staff

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^{*} We understand that since this report was written steps have been taken to create a separate Office of Scientific Intelligence which is to include the Nuclear Fnergy Group.

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of this Division should include sufficient representation from the State Department and the Services to insure that their needs are adequately met.

- (2) The Coordination Division. (reconstituted Interdepartmental Coordinating and Planning Staff) should be given the responsibility for studying the actual scope of the Research and Reports Division and for recommending those sorvices of common concern which should be performed controlly.
- (3) The propriety of the preparation by the Central Intelligence agency of essentially political summeries should be reviewed, taking into consideration the need for such summeries, the existence of a number of duplicating summeries and the particular capabilities of the individual departments to prepare them.
- (4) The various reports, studies and summaries which are not national intelligence or recognized services of common concern should be discontinued.



